We reexamine the widely held belief that free availability of scientific articles increases the number of 
Introduction
The dominant business model in scientific publishing is 'reader pays', i.e., university libraries pay for academic journals through subscriptions. However, an alternative model is gaining momentum where authors pay and readers have free and immediate access ('open access') to the full text of scientific articles. The emergence of open access is facilitated by sharp decreases in dissemination costs with the advent of electronic publishing, growing expectations that the results of publicly funded research should be freely available and increased strains on library budgets associated with substantial increases in journal prices (McCabe 2002 , Dewatripont et al. 2006 . 
An important question in this context is whether (and by how much) open access increases
the number of citations received by scientific papers. As researchers care about the visibility of their work, they may be willing to pay to ensure that their work receives a larger number of citations. Indeed the present value of a single additional citation for a 35-year-old physicist's work was estimated to exceed 3000 current dollars (Diamond 1986) . Because the open access citation advantage underpins the willingness of authors and institutional actors to pay for open access, it is central to the dynamics of the scientific publishing market.
The mainstream opinion in the information science literature is that open access increases the number of citations received by scientific papers and that this effect is quantitatively important.
The seminal contribution is Lawrence (2001) who finds that computer science conference articles that were openly accessible on the Web were cited more often than those that were not (+150%).
Studies by Walker (2004) 
A simple model
We formalize here the idea that open access is relatively more attractive to authors of higher quality papers and its implications. Let q i be the quality of the article defined as the probability of the article being cited conditional on the article being read. q i is exogeneously given and heterogenous across articles. The number of citations N generated by an article of quality q i is thus N (q i , n) = nq i where n is the number of readers. Authors value citations as they help them secure peer recognition, jobs, promotions and continued research funding (Stephan 1996) . However, the present value of a citation may vary across authors for instance according to age and career stage. δ j is the (heterogeneous and exogeneously given) present value of a citation.
Authors maximise the present value of the number of citations generated by an article minus the publication cost c: Utility maximisation thus involves resolving a tradeoff between the costs of publication and a larger
readership. An author will choose to publish in open access if
The comparative statics are straightforward: a paper is more likely to be published in open access if the quality q i of the paper is high, if the present value of a citation δ j is high, if the cost of We focus on articles published in the area of biological sciences which represents approximatively 90% of papers published in PNAS. An important point is that contrary to economics or physics, circulation of pre-publication papers (working papers, preprints,...) is inexistent in biology where pre-publication would significantly decrease the chances of subsequent publication in an academic journal. Self-archiving by authors is also uncommon. To verify that, we searched for full text versions of articles published in one issue of PNAS three months after its publication. Of the 43 articles published in restricted access, we were able to find only two cases where a full-text version was freely available elsewhere on the web.
For cited papers, we know from the website of the journal whether the article was published in open access or not, the names of the authors, the publication date, the subfield in which it was published, the email address of the corresponding author, the submission track 3 and whether the article was featured on the cover of the journal.
Citation data
Citation data were extracted from ISI Web of Science which includes citations from over 7000 scientific journals. For citing papers, we know the time of publication and the journal where they are published. We use this information to construct the cumulative number of citations after various lengths of time. 
Controls
Author quality. We construct two proxies to control for author quality. First, we match the names of the last author (who is typically the head of the lab) with Medline data extracted using
PublicationHarvester (Azoulay et al., 2006) . We use these data to construct the variable 'Last author productivity' which is defined as the number of publications of the last author weighted by the impact factor of the publishing journal and divided by the number of years since (s)he started publishing 4 . Second, we construct a dummy that takes value 1 if the last author is a superstar, 4 One problem we encountered is that it is difficult to identify publications for authors with common last names. The procedure we used to deal with this issue was to exclude observations where the last author had a very common last name (more than 5 occurrences of different authors with the same last name in our dataset). This results in a loss of 590 observations mainly for papers with last authors with an Asian name. For moderately common names (between 2 and 5 occurrences of different authors with the same last name in our dataset), we kept them in the dataset but adjusted the total number of publications downwards by dividing the total number by the number of different occurrences in the dataset. The results of our paper are robust to alternative specifications.
5 http://www.f1000biology.com
Instruments
Our empirical strategy consists of instrumenting open access to isolate the effect of diffusion from self-selection. Our preferred instrument is a dummy for publication in the last quarter of the fiscal year. We exploit here the fact that academic departments may have leftover budgets that need to be spent before the end of the fiscal year 6 . One otherwise low-priority item on which budgets can be spent is paying for open access fees for papers about to be published in PNAS. While there is evidence of fiscal year seasonality influencing economic outcomes (Oyer 1998) , to the best of our knowledge we are the first to use it as an instrument. In our data, 21% of articles published in the 
Econometric specification and results
As a benchmark we estimate with ordinary least squares and robust standard errors:
where Y is the number of citations after two years and X is the complete set of control variables described in the preceding section.
We then implement the instrumental variable strategy with two-stage least squares (2SLS) and with GMM which is more efficient 2SLS under conditional heteroskedasticity (Hayashi 2000) . We for article quality (the evaluation on F1000 biology and broad appeal) are positive and significant.
The dummy for 'must read' is significant at the 5% confidence level. The dummy for 'exceptional'
is not significant but the number of articles in this category is very small. A joint F-test on the three F1000 dummies reject the null that they are not different from zero at the 1% confidence countries from the date of publication and PNAS is one of the least expensive scientific journals in terms of both price per article and price per citation. Open access articles enjoy an even larger citation advantage considering citations in Science, Nature and Cell, although authors publishing in these highly prestigious journals can hardly be expected to lack extensive access to the scientific literature. We report the details of these results elsewhere (cf. Gaule & Maystre 2008) . 
Concluding remarks
The specific contribution of this paper is to show (1) at least part of the larger number of citations received by open access papers is due to a self-selection effect rather than a diffusion effect and (2) 
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